Leading the way: Leadership experience and International Crises

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Abstract: *This paper explores how a leader's past military experiences shape their use of force behavior. Employing the LEAD data on military experiences, we review how various experiences including military service, education, combat, and rebel involvement shape a leader's decision-making. While previous research examined how these experiences affect MID onset/initiation decisions, we examine how these impact how a leader acts in crisis. We focus on how the leader views conflict as a tool and their willingness to employ it at a high level. Using the ICB data on crises, we test many of these characteristics using a multivariate regression model. Surprisingly, many of the factors do not have a significant impact. However, rebel experience stands out as an important contribution to a leader's behavior.*

Introduction

The leader plays a central role in shaping state behavior in international relations. Indeed, in his work, Hans Morgenthau (1948) observed that a nation's fate can be determined by the ability of its political leadership. Likewise, the founder of the neorealist school of thought, Kenneth Waltz, also described the individuals as one of his three levels of analysis (1959; 1979). Yet, despite widespread acknowledgement of leaders' importance, the international relations scholarship has mainly focused on structural variables as well as state-level characteristics. Recently, however, a new research agenda has emerged, reviving the interests towards leaders in international relations theory development. By focusing on leaders as the unit of analysis, scholars of this new wave have revealed how leader attributes such as age (Potter 2007), gender (Koch and Fulton 2011), beliefs and leadership style (Keller 2005), and past experience (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015) can influence the outcome of foreign policy and international events.

Contributing to this resurgence, this study focuses on how leaders' background can affect their behavior during crises. Specifically, employing the LEAD dataset (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015) and ICB data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), this study aims to identify how leaders' military background influences their proneness to violence during crises. In doing so, this study can provide insights into how leaders with military background behave in delicate situations as crises. Such insights can be important for both the public as well as politicians in democracies in selecting and constraining the top leader with respect to his/her foreign policy. In addition, the findings of this study can inform leaders around the world, thereby helping them to better predict and manage crises in the future.

Apart from its potential contributions in practice, this study would also enriches the current literature. Unlike most previous studies on leaders, which have focused on leader

attributes' influence on state behavior in militarized disputes (Horowitz, Ellis, and Stam 2015), this research aims to examine the influence of leader background experience on their tendency to use violence during crises and the intensity in their use of such forceful solutions. This research inquiry, therefore, adds to only a few available quantitative studies on leaders' crisis behavior in the current literature. The combination of the ICB and LEAD dataset is also another contribution to the literature.

Literature Review

Many studies have been conducted about factors driving foreign policy crisis behavior of states, specifically their proneness to the use of violence as a crisis resolution method. Most findings within this tradition can be grouped into two categories – contextual variables and state-level variables. Regarding elements of the context, most studies suggest that the level of violence used in a state's response is also affected by the gravity (or importance) of the crisis – whether it poses a grave threat to a state's important values (Andersen-Rodgers 2015; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; DeRouen and Sprecher 2004). In addition, similar to research on international disputes, contiguity has been found to have an impact on state crisis behavior. Specifically, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) find that smaller distance between a state and the location of the crisis increases the likelihood of violence, which is consistent with other research findings that proximity of adversaries significantly increases the probability of war (Henderson 1997; Vasquez 1993). Another factor - power - has also been consistently shown to affect the use of violence during international crises is power, though with inconsistent findings. On the one hand, some research reveals that power disparity reduces the likelihood of violence initiation (Bremer 1992). On the other hand, other scholars argue, from a monadic perspective, that states possessing a power advantage over their rivals are more likely to employ military actions in crises (Prins 2005). This perspective echoes research findings related to

international conflict initiation, which argues that higher capabilities provide states with a higher opportunity to engage in wars (Most and Starr 1989).

With respect to how internal characteristics of the state can affect its use of force during international crises, robust evidence have pointed out that democratic states are more likely to pursue non-violent means in their crisis management (Andersen-Rodgers 2015; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001).

In a comprehensive analysis, Butler (2018) incorporates a wide range of variables related to the context of the crisis, process of a state decision-making, and international system in order to explain a state's choice of non-violent crisis management. Consistent to Andersen-Rodgers's (2015), Butler finds that non-violent crisis management is more likely to occur in crises that are free from protracted conflict between crisis actors. Moreover, pacifistic conflict management techniques are more likely to be used in crises involving a small number of actors or crisis actors that are in the midst of regime transitions.

Although having accumulated an abundance of evidence on the influence of various factors to the crisis behavior of states, scholars of international crises have paid little attention to the role of personal attributes of state leaders in determining the level of violence in state crisis behavior. This leaves an important gap to be filled as the leader plays a central role in shaping the state behavior during crises. For this reason, variations in personal characteristics of leaders are likely to lead to variations in how different leaders respond to a similar set of circumstances, resulting in differences in state crisis behavior. Indeed, among a few studies focusing on the role of the leader in determining a state's violent behavior, Keller (2005) finds, using text analysis, that chief executives whose leadership styles categorized as constraint challengers are more likely to use violence during crisis situations. In addition, a constraint-challenging leader is also more likely to use more severe forms of violence. These patterns

hold even when controlling for different regime types. In the international dispute literature, research about potential sources of a chief executive's leadership style – his/her experiences prior to office – have produced results showing that leader attributes have significant influences on state conflict behavior (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). Such evidence suggests that more effort should be spent on investigating the role of leaders' personal attributes in shaping state crisis behavior.

Theory

Regarding leaders' role in shaping state behavior, Horowitz and Fuhrmann (2018) identifies two broad camps in studying state leaders and international disputes. The first camp, named "institutional leadership school", focuses on how international and domestic constraints shape the behavior of leaders. Many research in this camp also assumes that leaders' primary goal is to remain in power (Leeds and Davis 1997; Goemans 2000; Schultz 2001). In other words, while leaders are placed at the center of theory development, this camp argues that different leaders are affected, and thus respond, in the same way under a same set of constraints in order to maintain power.

The second camp, while also focusing on the leader as the central unit of analysis, argues that state leaders have different values, beliefs, attributes, and experiences. Thus, different leaders will be affected by and respond to the international and domestic events in distinct ways, thereby driving states' foreign policy in different directions. For this reason, scholars advocating for this "leader attribute school" focus on studying leaders' attributes such as age (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Potter 2007), gender (Koch and Fulton 2011), and character and beliefs (Hermann 1980; Keller 2005). Recent works have also studied leaders' prior experiences (Fuhrmann 2017; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015).

Echoing the second camp, this study argues that the leaders' prior experiences – being the source of leaders' values, beliefs, and personality – is central in driving the state's behavior in the international arena. Facing serious crises, states have multiple tools at their disposal to resolve the issue at hand. Such tools exist in areas of diplomatic, economic, and military realms. One of the more extreme conflict resolution tools is to threaten or use violence against another state. As bargaining model scholars have argued, solving disputes through violence rather than compromising and finding an acceptable bargaining solution is highly inefficient. Because violence is often a more costly conflict resolution tool, many states are hesitant to employ it unless the issue is highly salient. However, certain leadership characteristics might prime leaders to employ military tools earlier in a crisis scenario as well as be willing to escalate a crisis even though conflict and war is often considered a suboptimal and risky solution. We examine how a leader's military/rebel experience affects his/her use of force during international crises. We examine if certain military experiences prime leaders to consider force more often than other tools. We also consider if certain experiences affect a leader's willingness to engage in increased severity of violence.

Military Background

Service/Career Experience: Military service experience is defined as past involvement within the organizational structure of the military at any rank or any previous military instruction prior to admission into the armed forces. Career experience is long term employment in the military. Sechser (2004) and others (Brodie 1973; Janowitz 1960) identify three reasons why leaders with military backgrounds would be more likely to incite interstate violence than civilian leaders. First, those in the military are taught to see military solutions as the best options rather than diplomatic and economic solutions to world issues and therefore overvalue military expenditure. Additionally, they are more likely to resort to speedy, and possibly hasty, decision-making that is required within their profession because slow decision

making is met with death on the battlefield. Finally, the idea of a glorious victory is idealized in military environments. Those with military service experience see the acquisition of glory primarily through the direct use of offensive war in which they emerge as the victor. While state leaders will gain experience and solve problems using other mechanisms, past service experience should at least make them more predisposed toward a favorable preference of the military as an option to solve disputes. Furthermore, they are more primed to see this as a central option. For those with career experience, these values and beliefs would be further inculcated into their belief sets.

Hypothesis 1A: A leader's military service increases the centrality of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Hypothesis 1B: A leader's military service increases the severity of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Education/Training: Military education and some forms of non-basic training is almost unilaterally a necessity to gaining higher positions within military structures throughout the world. Sechser (2004) says that military officers, who have often received advanced military education, see conflicts and diplomatic issues solely through a militaristic lense and thus will seek military solutions to world issues. This advanced training should be particularly influential toward a leader's problem solving tool set.

Hypothesis 2A: If a leader has advanced military education, it increases the centrality of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Hypothesis 2B: If a leader has advanced military education, it increases the severity of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Combat/Non-combat: According to Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015), military combat service is defined as "the deployment to a combat zone where the leader could face the risk of death in combat," while military non-combat service is when the leader has military experience, but never faces the risk of death as a result of their service (727). As discussed earlier, any military experience will increase propensity towards conflict. However, the difference between military combat or non-combat experience for a leader may result in different likelihoods of crisis escalation. In addition, among those who have military experience, combat experience is found to have an effect on leaders' ability to evaluate foreign policy situations. Those with military service or career but have not directly experienced war are often less aware of the limitations and costs that forceful solutions bring. In contrast, those with combat experience are more likely to have a cautious and realistic view on what violence can and cannot achieve (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). This difference is shown in a survey experiment where combat veterans are far less likely to see military force as justifiable (Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro 1990). A similar conclusion is reached by Horowitz and Stam (2014) as they find leaders having military service but without combat experience are the most likely to initiate militarized disputes. Likewise, leaders with prior military career (and no combat experience) are more likely to have their coercive challenges reciprocated for being more assertive in coercive bargaining.

Hypothesis 3A: A leader's combat experience during military service decreases the centrality of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Hypothesis 3B: A leader's combat experience during military service decreases the severity of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Rebel Experience: Another important form of military experience is rebel participation. For one thing, rebel participation offers significant payoffs, especially for rebel

leaders who would likely be in a top position of the new government (if the rebellion succeeds). However, the uncertain victory along with consequences of this are gravely dangerous. Thus, rebel participants are often individuals who are more risk-acceptance than average people. In addition, the experience in a rebel movement can reinforce one's favorable beliefs toward the use of force (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). Those who enter office as a result of rebel participation are likely to see force as a favorable tool to solve problems (Colgan 2013). Findings in quantitative analyses – showing that leaders with rebel experience are more likely to initiate militarized disputes – have validated this argument (Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). In addition, Horowitz, Potter, Sechser, and Stam (2018) find that previous rebels are more likely to be assertive and make higher demands in coercive bargaining as they enter office.

Hypothesis 4A: A leader's rebel participation increases the centrality of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Hypothesis 4B: A leader's rebel participation increases the severity of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Cumulative Effect: Inculcation of military ideals will vary by degree of exposure. Thus, greater exposure should have an additive effect on the leaders' willingness to consider force as a primary option as well as how much force to use.

Hypothesis 5A: The depth of a leader's military experiences will increase the centrality of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Hypothesis 5B: The depth of a leader's military experiences will increase the severity of violence in his/her crisis management technique.

Research Design

Unit of Analysis & Sampling

Central to this study are two questions about the leader's behavior when confronting foreign policy problems: how likely a leader is to employ violent solutions during crises and how intense the leader can be in using such solutions. In order to reflect this emphasis, the unit of analysis in this study is leader-crisis. Within this research, a foreign policy crisis is defined as a situation when a state's top decision makers, due to changes in the state's internal or external environment, perceive a threat to basic values with a high likelihood of involvement in military hostilities, along with a limited time for response (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

To test the strength of the proposed hypotheses across temporal and geological span, a statistical analysis is conducted with 974 foreign policy crises from 1918 to 2004 involving 427 effective leaders drawn from a diverse pool of regions, cultures, and political systems.

To compile the data, a dataset is first generated using NewGene, drawing key independent variables from the LEAD (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015). Democracy data is gathered from PolityV data (Marshall and Gurr 2020). The final dataset is then created by merging the NewGene-generated data with the dependent and other control variables in the International Crisis Behavior data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), thereby matching leaders who have experienced international crises.

Dependent Variables: The Centrality and Severity of Violence

The centrality of violence refers to the importance of forceful methods compared to other crisis management techniques employed by a state leader within an international crisis. In other words, this variable measures the leader's tendency to resort to violence in order to

solve political problems at hand. As coded by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), there are 4 ordered levels for this predictor, including (1) no violence being used, (2) violence being used but in a minor role compared to other non-violent methods, (3) violence being heavily relied upon, yet complemented by other methods, and (4) violence being used as the dominant method for crisis management.

The severity of violence, on the other hand, focuses entirely on the intensity of the violent methods utilized by a crisis actor. This variable consists of an ordinal scale as coded by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), with (1) being no violence, (2) being minor clashes, (3) denoting serious classes, and (4) indicating full-scale war.

A Combined Measurement

While offering a helpful predictor of state crisis behavior, each of the two mentioned variables only gauge a separate aspect of a crisis actor's use of force during a crisis. Therefore, to have a more powerful measurement, the authors create a new dependent variable by multiplying the centrality and severity of violence, resulting in a 9-level variable (1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 16). This new variable can provide a more comprehensive indication of a leader's behavior with respect to the use of violence – it captures a chief executive's inclination to forceful approaches as well as fierceness in employing these means. In addition, this variable is able to measure the leader's perception of his/her ability to successfully carry out the chosen violent methods.

Independent Variable

To fully examine a state leader's background with violence, the authors create the *Military Background Index*, a configuration comprising five dichotomous variables drawn from the LEAD (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 2015). Each of these variable pertains to a yes/no

question about the leader's past experiences with the use of force in solving political problems, including whether the leader (1) served in the military, (2) was a military officer, (3) received military education, (4) served in the military without combat experience, (5) served in the military in actual combat, and (6) participated in a rebellion. Based on the logic that the effect of each type of experience is compounded to result in a leader's proneness to violence, each "yes" answer in the first 4 questions, as well as the last question, is converted to a +1, while a "yes" answer in the fifth question (combat experience) is transformed into a -1. Justifications for the configuration of the Military Background Index, particularly its component variables, are discussed specifically below.

Military Service: This variable is related to the first question - whether the leader served in the military service in the military before entering office. A value of 1 in this variable denotes the leader's service in the national military, while a value of 0 indicates no service. The variable captures a leader's view acquired through his/her time serving in the military, which is expected to increase the leader's likelihood to favor forceful solutions.

Military Career: This variable serves as an indication of a head of state's past experience as a military officer. The inclusion of this variable is appropriate for measuring whether a leader's positive view about force is acquired and reinforced throughout his/her life-long career. The variable is binary, with 0 denoting no prior military career and 1 indicating past military career.

Military education: This variable captures whether a leader received training in the use of violence. A previous education is expected to increase a leader's favor towards violent policies' utility as well as overconfidence in his/her ability to use force successfully. Similar to the other variables, this variable is a dichotomous indicator.

Military service - no combat: This variable related to whether a state leader had combat experience during his/her service in the military. Despite already including military service in the index, as discussed above, the authors add this no combat variable based on the reasoning that a non-combat experience can augment the effect of a military service.

Military service - combat: This variable measures a leader's experience in actual combat. The literature review suggests that combat experience would have the opposite effect compared to military service without combat. Particularly, past research has shown combat to be a fear triggering event and, thus, have a negative effect on a leader's proneness to violent solutions (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). For this reason, combat experience enters the Military Background Index as a negative component.

Rebel Participation: This measurement captures a leader's participation in a rebellious movement prior to entering the office. A value of 1 in this variable shows past involvement in a rebellion in any role, while a 0 shows no rebel experience. Rebel experience is expected to increase a leader's probability of using violence and, therefore, is added into the Military Background Index with a positive sign.

Controls

A number of contextual variables are worthy of being taken into account. The first among them is *gravity* of threat (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). As defined by the ICB project, gravity in this study refers to the most serious threat a state faces in a crisis, ranging from 0 (economic threat) to 6 (threat to existence), along with 7 (other). However, seeing this category as non-relevant, this study drops the values of 7 as missing variables. Also included in this study's model is the state's *location from the crisis*. Similar to gravity of threat, this variable is taken from the ICB data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). However, this factor is recoded in

this study as (1) for crises within a state's sub-region or home territory, and (0) for crises occurring further. .

Apart from contextual factors, this study also controls for state-level variables that can potentially affect a state's proneness to violence in a crisis. First, the *regime type* of a crisis actor will be controlled for using a recoded polity2 score in the Polity V data set (Marshall and Gurr 2020). A state is coded as a democracy if its score is (6) or larger. In addition, *power of the crisis actor* will also be accounted for using the recoded version of the power status variable in the ICB data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), with (1) indicating that the state is either a great power or superpower. Along with the capability of the state, the study also controls for a state's strongest *opponent's power status* (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). Similar to the crisis actor capability, this variable is coded as minor or middle power (0) and major or great power (1).

Statistical procedures

Based on the nature of the dependent variable, the study generates an OLS regression[1] model to examine the influence of key independent variables while controlling for other characteristics of the state and the crisis's context.

Analysis

Bivariate tables

To test the individual effects of each military experience, we ran 12 different bivariate tests. The tests examined if military service, military career, military non combat experience, military combat experience, military education, and rebel experience individually affected the

[1] For the dependent variable that coded 1-4, we also tested them using an ordered logit and found no significant changes in the variables using this alternative procedure.

centrality of violence and severity of violence. The tables are not shown but the results were generally not supportive of the hypotheses. While all of the variables were in their expected directions, using Chi squared and gamma values, the only significant variable was rebel. Rebel is significant at the .01 level with a gamma of .25.

Multivariate tables

The results testing the cumulative effects hypothesis which connects a leader's military background to centrality and severity of violence are discussed below. The cumulative experience index variable is supported. It is significant at .05 level in the first three models that utilize three different dependent variables. In all of the models, all of the control variables are significant and in their expected direction. Model 1 offers some evidence that the military background of leaders affects how a leader uses different conflict resolution tools. Model 2 supports the argument that background shapes the willingness of leaders to engage in more severe conflict.

Table 1: Multivariate Regression Results on Crisis Severity and Crisis Centrality

Model Sample		*Model 1: Centrality of Violence*	*Model 2: Severity of Violence*	*Model 3: Centrality and Severity of Violence*
Leader's Military Background	B	0.0571**	0.0614**	0.2531**
	Se_β	0.0289	0.0279	0.1273
Shared Region		0.2446**	0.3419***	1.315**
		0.1181	0.1140	0.5206
Threat Level (Gravity)		0.1660***	0.2161***	0.9587***
		0.0280	0.0270	0.1232
Democracy		-0.2038**	-0.2131**	-1.015**
		0.1013	0.1979	0.4470
Power Status		0.3006***	0.2234**	1.301***
		0.0980	0.0946	0.4322

Opponent Power	-0.3414***	-0.2535***	-1.135***
Status	0.0814	0.0786	0.3588
R-Squared	0.06	0.08	0.08
N	964	964	964

Notes: $*p < 0.1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

While Table 1 is supportive of hypothesis 5a and 5b, the bivariate tables only demonstrated support for rebel experience. To explore how much of the cumulative index experience variable is affected by the significance of rebel experience, four more models are displayed below (Models 4-7) and further breaking down the variables. Models 4 and 5 examine military experience without the rebel component. In this model, the military background is not close to significant. However, models 6 and 7 only use a dichotomous variable of rebel experience or no rebel experience. The rebel variable is highly significant and performs overall better than the military experience variable tested in the first three models in Table 1.

Table 2: Multivariate Regression Results on Crisis Severity and Crisis Centrality with and without Rebel experience

Model Sample		*Model 4: Centrality no Rebel*	*Model 5: Severity no Rebel*	*Model 6: Centrality only Rebel*	*Model 7: Severity only Rebel*
Leader's Military	B	0.0211	0.0289		
Background – minus Rebel	Se_β	0.0339	0.0327	-	-
Rebel Experience				0.3479***	0.3362***
		-	-	0.0827	0.0799
Shared Region		0.2519**	0.3505***	0.1782	0.2782**
		0.1183	0.1143	0.1184	0.1144
Threat Level		0.1662***	0.2161\2***	0.1633***	0.2135***
(Gravity)		0.0280	0.0271	0.0277	0.0268
Democracy		-0.2433**	-0.2512***	-0.1719*	-0.1882**
		0.1006	0.0972	0.0990	0.0957
Power Status		0.3072***	0.2299**	0.2889***	0.2130**
		0.0982	0.0948	0.0973	0.0940

Opponent Power	-0.3381***	-0.2506***	-0.3575***	-0.2688***
Status	0.0815	0.0787	0.0809	0.0782
R-Squared	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.09
N	964	964	964	964

Notes: *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

Alternative dependent variables codings

Since much of the literature on leadership characteristics uses a logistic regression with regards to onset/initiation of a MID, we also coded centrality and severity variables as dichotomous variables where 1-2 in the original variables equals to 0 and 3-4 equals 1. We also then multiplied the two variables together to form a centrality and severity variable. This was a bit more supportive of other leadership characteristics besides rebel involvement. Military non combat experience was positive and significant in bivariate tests. Several other bivariate tests came close to significance as well. The Military Background Index, excluding rebel participation, was significant at the .1 level. Rebel was still highly significant in this coding as well.

Implications and conclusions

This research set out to test how leaders' military backgrounds shaped their foreign policy problem solving. It examines whether certain experiences prime leaders to think of military options as their primary tool and also examines if these experiences made them more open to use of severe actions. Knowing this seems especially important in democracies where citizens, at least in part, evaluate leaders' past experiences for purposes of qualifications. Additionally, the findings can potentially assist leaders and observers across the world in predicting and managing crisis situations. However, while previous studies found supportive

evidence that leaders' military backgrounds affected their willingness to engage and initiate a MID, they have yet to address crisis escalation scenarios.

Past rebel experience, while supported in some past studies in onset/initiation studies, is not commonly cited as a key variable (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). However, this research provides evidence that it is the most significant and robust characteristic that shapes a leader's behavior. Surprisingly, other characteristics were not supported under most conditions. Even the commutative military experience (the Military Background Index) for a leader did not seem to affect his/her crisis behavior under most coding structures without rebel experience included.

While we explored several coding variations for the independent and dependent variables, one that we did not explore deeply was the weighting of certain characteristics. For example, we did find that the military background variable was more significant in the first three models if we doubted the negative from combat experience. This entire research program is based on an epistemology of experience. Leader's behaviors are shaped by past experiences. We did this because we thought that some experience might have a greater impact on a leader's decision making process. Nonetheless, while we played around with combat experience a little we did not do this with other characteristics. The leadership experience research program could benefit from weighting experiences.

Another analysis we considered but have yet to implement is a two-stage selection model. Reed (2000) found that initiation/onset experiences can shape escalation/severity. A two-stage crisis model might add another layer of understanding on how leaders' past experiences shape crises at various stages.

Lastly, we were surprised by the power of the rebel experience. Deeper research into why this particular encounter shaped leadership actions should be conducted, as exploring why this factor matters while others do not can be fruitful for identifying other experiences. It could be that certain rebel experiences matter more than others or that a selection bias exists within the process of becoming a chief executive as a result of a rebellion.

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